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Abstract - Distributed decision making has been identified
as a source of managerial complexity for the SoS engineer.
A new framework, AIR (Anticipation-Influence-Reaction), is
proposed to capture the feedback relationship between the
decisions made by constituents and those made by the man-
agers of the SoS. AIR is then used to develop a five-member
set of basic influences that can bring about changes in con-
stituent behavior thus modifying the SoS. These influences,
the 5 I’s, are Incentives, Information, Infrastructure, Inte-
gration, and Institutions. AIR and the influences are demon-
strated through qualitative application to real-world SoS and
quantitatively through a simulation of an inter-modal trans-
port network. It is found that cooperation between compet-
ing constituents can be quite fragile and sensitive to the SoS
context. Careful, dynamic planning of influence strategies is
needed to maintain SoS behavior in the face of constituents
who are driven by self-interest and a limited, local perspec-
tive of the SoS.
Keywords: Systems of systems; Influence; Management;
Complexity; freight; Simulation; Transportation; Inter-
modal; Game Theory; Distributed decision making; Antic-
ipation; Reaction
1 Introduction
Since the mid 90’s there has been a growing interest
in how systems come together to form systems of systems
(SoS). These coalitions of independently operated and man-
aged systems can meet unforeseen needs in a timely and cost
effective fashion. A challenge for systems engineers is to de-
sign, develop and manage constituent systems that are capa-
ble of successfully operating within a SoS. Traditional sys-
tems engineering theories and approaches do not fully ad-
dress the technical and managerial challenges caused by this
problem. This research focuses on developing better strate-
gies for coping with the managerial complexity caused by the
dynamic interactions between constituent systems within an
SoS. By understanding these interactions, systems engineers
and managers will be better able to develop engineering and
management strategies to influence an SoS.
Current interest in these SoS can be traced back to the
1990’s with the work of Maier [1, orig. published in 1996].
Maier defines two independence properties characteristic of
SoS that have subsequently been used by many author to de-
fine the class of systems termed SoS [a review can be found
in 2]. These two properties, operational independence and
managerial independence specify that both from a technical
and a social perspective an SoS is composed independent yet
interacting entities. This formulation has been extended and
refined over time, e.g., Boardman [3] define several dimen-
sions upon which SoS can be differentiated from traditional
systems. More recently, Karcanias [4] echoed Maier’s claim
stating:
“The multi-agent dimension of SoS has character-
istics such as:
Autonomy: the agents are at least partially au-
tonomous
Local Views: no agent has a full global view
of the system, or the system is too complex for an
agent to make practical use of such knowledge
Decentralisation (sic.): there is no designated
single controlling agent, but decision and informa-
tion gathering is distributed.” [4]
This third characteristic, distribution of decision mak-
ing, is a core challenge within SoS engineering. The design
and management of SoS is a problem of coordinating the
parallel development and operations of the SoS with its con-
stituents. Such coordination can be externally imposed such
as in an enterprise [5] or arise as consequence of interaction
between the constituents [6].
SoSE is a two-sided problem. On the one hand, it is a
technical problem of the determination of the appropriate in-
terfaces [1] between constituent systems in order to accom-
plish SoS objectives. On the other hand, it is a social problem
of convincing those who control the constituents to actually
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implement such interfaces [7]. Both challenges are recog-
nized gaps in the theoretical SoS literature and each has been
identified as a key components to SoS community’s research
agenda [8, 9].
A variety of frameworks have been proposed to de-
scribe the structure, operation and management of an SoS
[10, 11, 12]. Of particular importance is that each constituent
is trying to satisfy a locally specified value proposition, i.e.,
they are free to make decision that ensure their local needs
are met. The extent to which these decision support a broader
SoS agenda depends upon the alignment of these local needs
with the SoS goals mediated by whatever influences that the
SoS authority brings to bear upon the constituents.1 As de-
scribed by Bjelkemyr:
“Each system within a SoS is a self-interested
node in a network. These system nodes try to max-
imize their own utility under the influences of and
in competition with the other nodes. The global
SoS behavior thus emerges as a result of the ac-
tions at the lower levels of the SoS, down to the
system element level.” [12]
One can observe this challenge in real world SoSs.
For example, peering disputes among the Internet service
providers is an issue of choosing with which other systems
one wishes to connect, i.e., with whom to collaborate. In
October of 2005, Level 3 communications a Boston based
tier 1 Internet service provider decided to terminate its peer-
ing agreement with Cogent communications, another tier 1
provider [13]. By refusing to peer with Cogent, Level 3 cut-
off direct traffic flow between their respective networks. This
forced routing via third-party network increasing congestion
on those links. For some customers whose only connection
was via Level 3, they were disconnected from those hosts
whose only connection was via a Cogent network. The same
was true in the other direction. After a few days, cooler heads
prevailed and the peered connection was reestablished [14].
The underlying cause of the dispute was an imbalance in traf-
fic flow between the two networks. Level 3 felt that Co-
gent was in violation of their contract when Cogent tried to
make inroads into Level 3’s market of selling access to Tier
2 providers. If a given Tier 2 provider, directly connected to
Cogent instead of going through Level 3, this would might
create a traffic imbalance to Cogent’s benefit.
The essential difference between the decision structure
in traditional SE vs. SoSE is one of alignment. The SoS ar-
chitect may need to influence the constituent decision makers
to behave in a manner that is not necessarily locally optimal
for them but does serve the interest of the SoS. This relation-
ship between the SoS architect and the constituent decision
1The situation is somewhat different in the case of directed SoS. The fact
that a central authority has coercive influence on the constituents renders
the problem of SoS and constituent alignment moot, however, it can also
bring additional responsibility on the central authority to manage constituent
needs.
makers is a principal-agent problem [15].2 In the SoS case,
the principal is the central authority/SoS architect whowishes
to effect some SoS behavior that they value via the actions of
the agents, i.e., constituents. Given this framing, the central
authority is referred to as an SoS principal. Note that con-
stituents may be interacting with multiple such authorities at
a given time (e.g. if they are participating in multiple SoS)
andmay also act as such an authority themselves with respect
to other constituents such as in a collaborative SoS.
2 Anticipation–Influence–Reaction
The role of the SoS Principal (or Influencer) is one of
coordinating constituent action to generate SoS behavior that
the principal desires via influencing the constituents. This
type of relationship is not new to the field of decision theory
or organizational management. In logistics, for example, the
problem is quite commonplace. Schneeweiss [16] extends
the work done in logistics to more generic distributed deci-
sion making problems in organizations. The current work
applies and extends his formulation to the SoS. While his fo-
cus was on the inter-organizational relationships, the current
research also includes the connection between organizations
and the systems they control. As a consequence, a broader
selection of influence mechanisms are considered. While
Schneeweiss, looks at direct incentives and information, the
current research extends that to include technological and
institutional mechanisms as well. Wernz [17] takes a simi-
lar approach in developing a theory of Multiscale Decision-
Making.
To generate these influences (see Figure 1 for a visual
description of the processes being described), the principal
first observes current SoS behavior. This observation is used
by the principal to capture the current state of the SoS and
evaluate direct changes they could make to SoS entities un-
der their direct control. Second, they anticipate constituent
decision-making and interactions. The word ‘anticipate’ is
used instead of ‘observe’ since, unlike system behavior, con-
stituent decision-making process is not generally visible to
the principal. As independent agents, constituents can make
choices in private only revealing them through their actions.
Therefore the principal must use their best estimate of con-
stituent action in assessing influence strategies. Third, based
upon observation of the systems and anticipation of con-
stituent decision-making, influences are brought to bear upon
the constituent with the aim of modifying their behavior.
Constituents respond to these influences in two ways.
First, they take actions to modify the systems they control
in response to the changes in their decision problem caused
by the influences. If the influences were well-formed and
2A classic example of this situation the the employer–labor relationship.
In that case the employer, wishes to maximize the productive output of her
firm. The output, however, is dependent upon the effort put forth by the
employees. The employees wish to maximize their total wages while min-
imizing work hours. Each player, the employer and the employees, makes
their own choices with regards to the variables they control.
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the principal’s understanding of the SoS and constituents ac-
curate, then the effect of those changes in the systems will
modify SoS behavior in an manner of value to the principal.
The principal will observe the extent to which this has oc-
curred (post-facto feedback). The constituents may also react
directly to the influences, signaling their (dis-)satisfaction.
These three interactions, anticipation, influence and re-
action, form the core social feedback mechanism between
SoS principals and their constituents, and give the AIR
framework its name.
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Figure 1. An SoS principal influences constituents to take ac-
tion that modify SoS behavior such that the principal’s objec-
tive are met. The upper portion of the diagram represents the
social interaction between the constituent decision makers
and the SoS principal, while, the lower portion represents the
technical interaction between the constituent systems in the
SoS. Constituent action are changes made in the constituent
systems by the constituent decision makers causing the SoS
to change over time.
To illustrate this approach for a collaborative SoS, the
AIR framework is applied to GEOSS, the Global Earth Ob-
servation System of Systems. GEOSS is an effort to combine
and coordinate the collection, dissemination and exploitation
of earth observation data3. A multinational effort, it is coor-
dinated by the Group on Earth Observation (GEO), an inter-
governmental organization with membership from 80+ coun-
tries. Each country contributes its own local data and exper-
tise. As the assets that produce this data are all locally man-
aged and operated, GEOSS is an SoS. It is also a federation
of systems as defined in [18]. One area of focus for GEO has
been the establishment of data sharing standards to allow re-
use of data collected by various GEOSS constituent systems
[19]. Khalsa [20] describes a pilot program by which GEO
3See http://www.earthobservations.org/geoss.shtml
is establishing an information system (of systems) for data
sharing. A key challenge in building this SoS has been been
diversity of needs of the end-users combined with the distri-
bution of decision making amongst globally (and, therefore,
culturally) dispersed constituents [21]. GEO met this chal-
lenge by implementing a service-oriented architecture (SOA)
for data sharing. The SOA allowed each constituent to chose
which data they published and specified a common repository
that served as a catalog for these data sources. The process
by which this repository was established is a good example
of the different pieces of the AIR framework in practice. The
constituents are the data providers. These same providers
formed a working group that serves as the SoS influencer or
principal.
As described in Khalsa [20], the data interoperability
pilot program proceeded in phases. In the first phase, rec-
ognizing, that in many cases, constituents were already ex-
changing data, an effort was made to document the de facto
standards under which these exchanges took place. This is
the observation process from Figure 1. In the next phase,
communities of potential users were formed to examine what
new data exchange/normalization requirements needed to be
developed to harmonize the de facto standards from the first
phase. This is the anticipation step within which the influ-
encer attempt to envisage how the constituents will respond
to various influences and thereby find the influences that best
induce the desired behavior of the SoS as a whole. In this
case, the working group identified the new standards and pro-
tocols needed to enable the desired use-cases of the GEOSS
members. The influence in this case is the offering of these
new standards for adoption by the constituents. In the third
phase, they will implement a demonstration version of the
new data exchange service repository, thereby creating a op-
portunity for the users to try the new approach before broader
deployment. This is a form of reaction, wherein private in-
formation to the constituents, i.e., the effect of the new stan-
dards upon them is revealed to the influencer through the con-
stituents’ participation in the demonstration.
3 Five basic influences (5 I’s)
The SoS principal or influencer is trying to effect the
choices being made by the constituents. Therefore, a natural
starting point for developing strategies are the constituents’
decision problems. Proposed below are five distinct ways
that the influencer can exert influence upon the constituents’
decision problems. Each influence mechanism impacts a dif-
ferent part of the constituent’s decision problem. They are
outlined in Figure 2 and are identified by an ‘I’ word and are
collectively known as the 5 I’s. They represent a basis set
of strategies and may be used in combination to create the
desired effect.
Incentives reward or penalize constituents for particular
behavior that they would not do otherwise. For example, one
may contract a commercial communication network to carry
SoS related traffic in addition to their normal operating load.
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Figure 2. Changing the constituent decision problem via in-
fluences. 𝑢 is the constituent’s utility function, 𝑥 their deci-
sion variables and ?̂? the decision made by others that affect
them and so must be estimated. Constraints have been split
into two groups, 𝑔 and ℎ reflecting those that arise from social
and technical concerns respectively
Information can be provided to constituents to modify
decisions made under uncertainty. For example, interface
specification documents provide potential SoS constituent
advance notice of the necessary interfaces needed for future
SoS participation.
Integration is the re-assignment of particular SoS com-
ponents to different constituents. A common example would
be combining two systems into one.
Infrastructure refers to introducing new technology into
the SoS. An example would be a new high-speed data net-
work to facilitate higher bandwidth inter-connection between
constituents and thereby encourage the formation of new in-
terfaces.
Finally, institutions refer to the rules and regulations
that constituents follow. An example of this would be al-
lowing collusion between ordinarily competing constituent
to ensure more efficient allocation of shared resources.
The 5 I’s can strategies can be applied to the Internet
peering dispute described earlier. Level 3 had several op-
tions available to it to resolve its peering dispute with Co-
gent. Using the influence mechanism of incentives, Level
3 could have renegotiated peering agreement to Cogent re-
quire compensation from Cogent in the event that traffic is
imbalanced. In terms of integration they could buy Cogent’s
business (or sell their business to Cogent). They could ex-
change additional information with Cogent, e.g., traffic data
and projections to better allow planning by both parties and
possibly avoid traffic imbalances. They could have modified
their technical infrastructure to selectively reduce the qual-
ity of service for Cogent customers traversing the Level 3
network. This would encourage those customers to find al-
ternate transport thereby reducing the traffic imbalance. Fi-
nally, they could use dispute resolution institutions provided
for in a typical peering agreement. Each of these approaches
has side-effects and one may leave Level 3 in a better posi-
tion that another, however, they do demonstrate the variety
of strategies available.
4 Case study: Intermodal Transport
To demonstrate the AIR framework and 5 I’s, they
are applied to the problem of intermodal freight transport.
Driven by both increasing demand and increased concern for
externalities such as environmental damage and noise, one
area of focus is making more efficient use of transportation
networks. In terms of overland transport, there is much in-
terest in greater use of intermodal transport [22]. Intermodal
transport refers to transportation solutions that, from an ori-
gin point to a destination, use two or more transport modes.
For inland transport in particular, research into rail-truck in-
termodal has revealed that combining rail with truck can lead
to significant cost savings when compared to using trucks
alone. This is a consequence of the greater efficiency of
rail over long distances and carrying large loads. In addi-
tion, using modern locomotive technology, rail can generate
less pollution than trucks for the same move [23]. On both
these accounts, increasing the use of rail via intermodal links
to the trucking system appears to be a beneficial policy objec-
tive. The objective of the case study, therefore, is to apply the
AIR (Anticipation-Influence-Reaction) framework to look at
the influence strategies in an intermodal transport network.
While the overall context being described in the case study is
manufactured, the behaviors of the constituents are rooted in
real-world examples.
4.1 Anticipation Phase
Recall that the anticipation phase consists of the SoS
principal attempting to understand the behavior of the con-
stituents (and by extension the SoS) so that he may look
at potential influences. Most SoS are far too complicated
to describe in a deterministic fashion. As such, building a
predictive model is impossible.4 Rather, the SoS principal
should seek to understand the key behaviors of and interac-
tions between the constituents and include those in a sim-
plified model that can be used to better understand the dy-
namics that emerge when all the pieces interact. This type
of ’behavioral’ model is much easier to produce. Using con-
cepts from the models proposed by Fernandez [24] and Gam-
bardella [25], the following local (constituent-level) decision
makers (DM) are identified: (1) Shippers; (2) Road opera-
tors; (3) Rail operators; (4) Terminal operators. SoS-level
decision makers are (1) Coalitions of mode/terminal opera-
tors who offer intermodal service as a door-to-door offering
as perceived by the shippers and (2) external influencers (aka
SoS principal) who provide incentives. For this study, the
SoS design problem is framed from the perspective of an ex-
ternal influencer who wishes to increase rail usage.
4This can be due to complexity, scale of the SoS, limitations on available
data to characterize past behavior and, conversely, inability to use past data
when consider novel SoS forms.
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For this case, an island transportation system is speci-
fied in which goods flow from two origin points to two des-
tination points. Connecting these are a network of road and
rail links with intermodal terminal between rail and road Fig-
ure 3. Traffic is simulated upon this network for a period of
15 years.
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Figure 3. A simple intermodal network
The model represents the interaction between two types
of agents – shippers who wish to use the transport network to
manage the stock of a good at the destination point and car-
riers (railroad operators and truckers) who provide transport
service between point on the network. The overall flow of
the model is shown in Figure 4.
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Figure 4. Overall transportation model flow
For the shipper model, shippers are assumed to use
trigger-fixed quantity reorder inventory management strat-
egy. Each quarter they attempt to find the transportation so-
lution that minimizes their total logistics cost [26]. There are
50 shippers each of whommove 2000 TEU (twenty foot con-
tainer equivalent units) per quarter. Rail pricing and opera-
tions (train frequency is the only operational variable consid-
ered) is modeled as profit maximization problem with expo-
nential forecasting used to estimate future behavior of other
actors (e.g. prices of competitiors). This is inspired by the
pricing approach used by BNSF as described in [27]. Pric-
ing and service frequency is re-evaluated each quarter. For
truck carriers the Owner/Operator Independent Driver Asso-
ciation5 cost model is used. Again, prices are set quarterly
to maximize profits and exponential forecasting is used. Ter-
minals are assumed to be fixed time delay transfers between
transport modes incurring a fixed cost per container moved.
In the baseline case, shippers form routes using a forward-
ing company to contract with the relevant carriers forming a
complete chain from their desired origin to destination. The
forwarding company as modeled is a simple monetary pass
through to the carriers.
Baseline results are shown in Figure 5. After a brief
period of variation, the market eventually settles to an almost
even split between traffic going on long haul truck and traffic
using an intermodal route.
Time [Con. Per.]
Tr
af
fic
 [T
EU
]
Total throughput per contract period
 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
x 104
LH Truck Rail−Forw Rail−Coop
Figure 5. Baseline case: Traffic allocation by mode – Aqua-
marine long haul truck; Purple road-rail intermodal with
routes formed via a forwarder
4.2 Influence phase
Two different influences are considered with respect to
intermodal terminal. The first provided a subsidy to offset
the additional cost borne by shippers when going through ter-
minals, while the second posited an infrastructural improve-
ment in terminal throughput [28]. Neither terminal improve-
ment nor subsidy had a significant impact on shipper mode
choice. The reason for this seems to be that, for the situa-
tion as modeled, terminal costs do not represent enough of
a share of total logistics cost to cause a shift in shipper be-
havior, and, shippers compensated of higher (and more vari-
able) transport delays by increasing inventory. As inventory
costs are increased, these influences begin to have an effect,
however, quite large costs shifts (more than 40% of per TEU
value per TEU held, on average, in inventory) are needed to
see a change.
In the case of road travel, Janic [23] claims that 20% of
the total cost can be attributed to externalities. Conversely,
5http://www.ooida.com/Education%26BusinessTools/Trucking_Tools/
costpermile.shtml
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in the intermodal case, only 6% of the cost is the from exter-
nalities. Upon imposition of the tax to cover this difference,
there is a shift of traffic from the road to the rail intermodal as
expected. However, that shift is small resulting in only 60%
of the traffic going on rail. Better than the baseline, but not
by much. Insufficient traffic is shifted to justify the railroad
increasing capacity. The net effect was little shift in traffic
in the long run and a large dead-weight loss to the shippers.
The final influence considered was an institutional
change to allow the formation of cooperative routes through
a negotiation between longhaul truckers and the railroad.
This is also an example of integration as two entities that
were separate are now acting together.Once formed, coali-
tions are kept in place for 4 contract periods (one year)
and then re-negotiated (prices for these cooperative routes
are re-evaluated every quarter to maximize the joint-profit
earned by the coalition). Coalition formation is modeled us-
ing the Nash bargaining solution with service offering of non-
involved parties forecasted as above. The results are shown
in Figure 6. The influence was turned after 20 quarters had
elapsed. There was an immediate and stark shift in traffic
away from the truck (teal in Figure 6) to rail intermodal –
both from coalitions (magenta) and via forwarding compa-
nies (purple). Though coalitions come and go as the other
parties adjust prices to make them no-longer advantageous,
for almost 30 quarters, truck traffic is kept to under 20% of
the total flow..
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Figure 6. Cooperative routes allowed case: Traffic allocation
by mode – Aquamarine long haul truck; Purple road-rail in-
termodal with routes formed via a forwarder; Magenta road-
rail via cooperative agreement
4.3 Reaction phase
To look at reaction requires examining how each of con-
stituent parties are effected by the influence mechanisms.
Both the tax and cooperative routes resulted in shifting traffic
from road to rail. However, the tax resulted in a significant
cost increase (11%) that was passed on to the shippers. Either
directly or through the carriers, they are likely to protest such
price increases. The cooperative route on the other hand re-
sulted in a net cost decrease to the shippers of 10%. Looking
just at this it would seem that the cooperative solution is the
best. However, the truckers suffer in that situation. Moving
so much traffic to rail greatly reduces their profits by almost
2/3. Theywould likely object to such amove. Thus, in imple-
mentation, the SoS principal would likely have to balance the
protests from the truckers while not placing to large a burden
on shippers. This is representative of the types of trade-offs
that can occur when influencing SoS with many interacting
constituents.
4.4 Observations, Limitations and Extensions
From a transportation perspective, the case study results
could lead one to hypothesize that external market interven-
tions such as taxes and subsidies can be less effective that
mechanisms that exploit self-interest such as allowing coop-
eration. The strong effect of cooperation is consistent with
empirical studies of intermodal transport networks [29]. Of
course such mechanisms may not always be available, but
when extant, they should be carefully considered. As formu-
lated, however, the case study model is quite simplified and
so its results should be taken as behavioral and not predic-
tive beyond showing potential trends. It can be extended to
include a, larger, more realistic route network and more var-
ied shipper and carrier populations such as in [30] allowing
better characterization of the effectiveness of the proposed
strategies. Costs of implementing the influences was not con-
sidered as evaluating the cost of a social change in way that is
comparable to a technological change is difficult. Nash bar-
gaining is only one approach to look at cooperation between
constituents. Other game-theoretic approaches such as those
developed in [31] could be particularly useful as they can be
applied to modeling the participation/cooperation decision in
other SoS.
5 Limitations of AIR and the 5 I’s
The preceding sections provide a glimpse into how the
AIR framework and the 5 I’s could aide an SoS principal.
There are several significant limitations and opportunities for
extension. With respect to the AIR framework, one must
keep in mind that AIR, on its own, is not sufficient for man-
aging an SoS. It is best used in the context of broader frame-
work such as those cited earlier. AIR only helps formulate
strategies for changing constituent behavior. It does not aide
in determining what the desired constituent behavior should
be. That is the design problem of SoS and progress towards it
has been made in [32]. Simulation andmodeling of SoS is re-
quired for AIR. Progress has been made there by [33, 34, 35].
As developed thus far, AIR assumes a fixed constituent set.
Changing this would require modeling a super-set of poten-
tial constituents and their respective life-cycles. In addition,
scaling the agent-based modeling approach demonstrated in
the case-study to very large numbers of constituents can be
challenging. For such large numbers, constituents may need
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to be represented as member of a class whose behavior is
characterized statistically instead of as individuals. Systems
dynamics can be helpful in such a situation as was shown
in [36] where multiple satellite operators were aggregated.
Determining the costs associated with influence mechanism,
especially those that are social in nature is quite challenging.
Research from political and organizational science should be
used in assessing such costs andmanaging trade-offs between
constituents that arise during the reaction phase. Finally, in-
fluence strategies were discussed in isolation andwere imple-
mented as such in the case study. In reality, they will likely
need to be used in combination to achieve the desired effect.
How to form such combined strategies is another area of re-
search.
6 Impact on SE practice
The AIR framework and 5 I’s can have significant im-
pact on systems engineering practice. They provide a simple,
consistent representation of the key roles that in the stake-
holder community that controls an SoS. At the highest level,
these are those of the constituent and the influencer. While
the notion of constituent is not new, the notion of an ‘influ-
encer’ is novel. More often than not the system of systems en-
gineer finds themselves in this influencing role that can only
indirectly effect the systems within the SoS. Traditional sys-
tems engineering is predicated on the ability of the highest
level stakeholder to proscribe requirements which determine
decision making at the lower levels. Such an approach would
not work in SoS when there was a conflict between the needs
of the system of systems engineer and that of the constituents.
Rather strategies that account for the local needs of the con-
stituents are required. The 5 I’s are a first steps towards de-
veloping such strategies.
As is demonstrated in the case study, counter-intuitive
results can occur when attempting to intervene in systems
of such significant decision-making complexity. Therefore
modeling such as the agent-based approach used in the case
is crucial to gaining a sufficient understanding of the dynam-
ics of the SoS before intervening in the real world. Examples
of this are replete in case studies of real SoS. When trying to
modernize document production in the DoD, the need of for
common standards was identified [6]. In implementing these
standards, however, problems arose given the diverse areas
in which the standards needed to be applied. Furthermore,
making such changes without disturbing on-going operations
was quite challenging. Even though the end-state was much
better than the status quo, there was a need to ensure local
buy-in to make the transitions happen. AIR and the 5 I’s can
help the systems engineer think through such issues system-
atically before making changes in already operating systems.
7 Summary
A key challenge in the management of SoS arise from
the operational and managerial independence of the con-
stituent systems. They are free to make decisions based upon
local concerns. As these concerns may not align with SoS
needs there is no guarantee that constituent decisions will
benefit the SoS. To help mitigate this, SoS principals must
use influence upon the constituents to make those actions that
support the SoS the preferred actions of the constituents, i.e.,
to ensure incentive compatibility [37]. The AIR framework
and 5 I’s can help with this task. By anticipating how con-
stituents will behave, understanding how influences change
their behavior and ensuring that mechanisms exist for con-
stituents to react, SoS principals can gain a deep understand-
ing of both the social and technical dynamics within their SoS
along with the levers available to them to change it. The 5 I’s,
incentives, information, infrastructure, integration and insti-
tutions provide a basis set of influences from which many
aspects of constituent decision making can be changed.
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